

# **Belkin F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4, F1DN102KVM-HA-4, F1DN202KVM-HA-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices**

Security Target

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# CONTENTS

<b>1</b>	<b>SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION.....	1
1.2	SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE.....	2
1.3	TOE REFERENCE.....	2
1.4	TOE OVERVIEW.....	2
	1.4.1 Security Features .....	2
	1.4.2 TOE Environment .....	4
1.5	TOE DESCRIPTION .....	5
	1.5.1 Evaluated Configuration .....	5
	1.5.2 Physical Scope .....	6
	1.5.3 Logical Scope.....	7
<b>2</b>	<b>CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.....</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1	COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM .....	9
2.2	PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE CLAIM .....	9
2.3	PACKAGE CLAIM.....	10
2.4	MODULE CLAIM.....	10
2.5	CONFORMANCE RATIONALE .....	10
<b>3</b>	<b>SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.....</b>	<b>11</b>
3.1	THREATS .....	11
3.2	ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES .....	12
3.3	ASSUMPTIONS.....	12
<b>4</b>	<b>SECURITY OBJECTIVES.....</b>	<b>14</b>
4.1	SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE .....	14
4.2	SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .....	19
4.3	SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE.....	20
<b>5</b>	<b>EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION.....</b>	<b>26</b>
5.1	CLASS FDP: USER DATA PROTECTION .....	27

5.1.1	FDP_AFL_EXT Audio Filtration .....	27
5.1.2	FDP_APC_EXT Active PSD Connections.....	28
5.1.3	FDP_CDS_EXT Connected Displays Supported.....	29
5.1.4	FDP_FIL_EXT Device Filtering .....	29
5.1.5	FDP_IPC_EXT Internal Protocol Conversion .....	30
5.1.6	FDP_PDC_EXT Peripheral Device Connection.....	31
5.1.7	FDP_PUD_EXT Powering Unauthorized Devices .....	33
5.1.8	FDP_RDR_EXT Re-Enumeration Device Rejection .....	33
5.1.9	FDP_RIP_EXT Residual Information Protection .....	34
5.1.10	FDP_SPR_EXT Sub-Protocol Rules .....	35
5.1.11	FDP_SWI_EXT PSD Switching .....	35
5.1.12	FDP_UDF_EXT Unidirectional Data Flow.....	37
5.2	CLASS FPT: PROTECTION OF THE TSF .....	37
5.2.1	FPT_FLS_EXT Failure with Preservation of Secure State .....	37
5.2.2	FPT_NTA_EXT No Access to TOE.....	38
5.2.3	FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing .....	39
5.3	CLASS FTA: TOE ACCESS .....	39
5.3.1	FTA_CIN_EXT Continuous Indications .....	39
<b>6</b>	<b>SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.....</b>	<b>41</b>
6.1	CONVENTIONS AND APPLICABILITY .....	41
6.1.1	Conventions .....	41
6.1.2	Section Applicability.....	41
6.2	SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL DEVICES .....	42
6.2.1	User Data Protection (FDP).....	45
6.2.2	Protection of the TSF (FPT).....	51
6.2.3	TOE Access (FTA).....	52
6.3	ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, AND F1DN102KVM-HA-4 .....	52
6.3.1	User Data Protection (FDP).....	52
6.4	ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4, AND F1DN202KVM-HA-4 .....	52
6.4.1	User Data Protection (FDP).....	53
<b>7</b>	<b>SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>54</b>

<b>8</b>	<b>SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE .....</b>	<b>55</b>
8.1	SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE .....	55
8.2	DEPENDENCY RATIONALE .....	55
	8.2.1 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.....	56
<b>9</b>	<b>TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .....</b>	<b>57</b>
9.1	USER DATA PROTECTION .....	57
	9.1.1 System Controller .....	57
	9.1.2 Keyboard and Mouse Switching Functionality .....	58
	9.1.3 Video Switching Functionality.....	59
	9.1.4 Audio Switching Functionality .....	63
9.2	PROTECTION OF THE TSF .....	64
	9.2.1 No Access to TOE .....	64
	9.2.2 Anti-tampering Functionality .....	65
	9.2.3 TSF Testing .....	65
9.3	TOE ACCESS.....	66
	9.3.1 Continuous Indications.....	66
<b>10</b>	<b>TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS .....</b>	<b>67</b>
10.1	TERMINOLOGY.....	67
10.2	ACRONYMS.....	67
<b>11</b>	<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>69</b>
	<b>ANNEX A – LETTER OF VOLATILITY .....</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>ANNEX B – SFR DEVICE MATRIX.....</b>	<b>1</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software.....	5
Table 2 – TOE Peripheral Sharing Devices and Features .....	6
Table 3 – Logical Scope of the TOE .....	8
Table 4 – Applicable Technical Decisions .....	10
Table 5 – Threats.....	12

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Table 6 – Assumptions.....	13
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE .....	19
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .....	20
Table 9 – Security Objectives Rationale .....	25
Table 10 – Functional Families of Extended Components .....	26
Table 11 – Devices and Applicable Sections.....	42
Table 12 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements .....	44
Table 13 – Audio Filtration Specifications .....	45
Table 14 – Summary of Additional Security Functional Requirements for F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, and F1DN102KVM-HA-4 .....	52
Table 15 – Summary of Additional Security Functional Requirements for F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4 and F1DN202KVM-HA-4 .....	53
Table 16 – Security Assurance Requirements.....	54
Table 17 – Functional Requirement Dependencies .....	56
Table 18 – Terminology .....	67
Table 19 – Acronyms.....	68
Table 20 – References .....	69
Table 21 – Security Functional Requirements and Devices .....	1

## **LIST OF FIGURES**

Figure 1 – Simplified Switching Diagram .....	4
Figure 2 – KVM Switch Evaluated Configuration .....	5
Figure 3 – Display EDID Read Function.....	60
Figure 4 – Display EDID Write Function .....	61
Figure 5 – Display Normal Mode .....	62
Figure 6 – Channel Selection.....	66

# 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION

This Security Target (ST) defines the scope of the evaluation in terms of the assumptions made, the intended environment for the Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Information Technology (IT) security functional and assurance requirements to be met, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) to which it is asserted that the TOE satisfies its IT security requirements. This document forms the baseline for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.

## 1.1 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION

**Section 1, ST Introduction**, provides the Security Target reference, the Target of Evaluation reference, the TOE overview and the TOE description.

**Section 2, Conformance Claims**, describes how the ST conforms to the Common Criteria, Protection Profile (PP) and PP Modules.

**Section 3, Security Problem Definition**, describes the expected environment in which the TOE is to be used. This section defines the set of threats that are relevant to the secure operation of the TOE, organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply, and secure usage assumptions applicable to this analysis.

**Section 4, Security Objectives**, defines the set of security objectives to be satisfied by the TOE and by the TOE operating environment in response to the problem defined by the security problem definition.

**Section 5, Extended Components Definition**, defines the extended components which are then detailed in Section 6.

**Section 6, Security Functional Requirements**, specifies the security functional requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE and the IT environment.

**Section 7, Security Assurance Requirements**, specifies the security assurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE and the IT environment.

**Section 8, Security Requirements Rationale**, provides a rationale for the selection of functional and assurance requirements.

**Section 9, TOE Summary Specification**, describes the security functions that are included in the TOE to enable it to meet the IT security functional requirements.

**Section 10, Terminology and Acronyms**, defines the acronyms and terminology used in this ST.

**Section 11, References**, provides a list of documents referenced in this ST.

## 1.2 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE

<b>ST Title:</b>	Belkin F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4, F1DN102KVM-HA-4, F1DN202KVM-HA-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Security Target
<b>ST Version:</b>	2.0
<b>ST Date:</b>	23 March 2023

## 1.3 TOE REFERENCE

<b>TOE Identification:</b>	Belkin F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4, F1DN102KVM-HA-4, F1DN202KVM-HA-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
<b>TOE Developer:</b>	Belkin International, Inc.
<b>TOE Type:</b>	Peripheral Sharing Device (Other Devices and Systems)

## 1.4 TOE OVERVIEW

These Belkin Secure Peripheral Sharing Devices (PSDs) are part of the Universal 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation Secure KVMs without DPP product line. These products are KVM switches with active anti-tampering, analog audio support, and DisplayPort and High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) video support.

### 1.4.1 Security Features

The Belkin Secure Keyboard, Video, Mouse (KVM) Switches allow users to share keyboard, video, mouse, and audio peripherals between a number of connected computers. Security features ensure isolation between computers and peripherals to prevent data leakage between connected systems.

The following security features are provided by the Belkin Secure KVM Switches:


- Video Security
  - Computer video input interfaces are isolated through the use of separate electronic components, power and ground domains
  - The display is isolated by dedicated, read-only, Extended Display Identification Data (EDID) emulation for each computer

- Access to the monitor's EDID is blocked
- Access to the Monitor Control Command Set (MCCS commands) is blocked
- Both DisplayPort and High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) video peripheral devices are supported
- Video input is accepted as DisplayPort or HDMI
- Keyboard and Mouse Security
  - The keyboard and mouse are isolated by dedicated, USB device emulation for each computer
  - One-way, peripheral-to-computer data flow is enforced through unidirectional optical data diodes
  - Communication from computer-to-keyboard/mouse is blocked
  - Non HID (Human Interface Device) data transactions are blocked
- Audio Security
  - One-way computer to speaker sound flow is enforced through unidirectional optical data diodes
- Hardware Anti-Tampering
  - Any attempt to open the product enclosure will activate an anti-tampering system, making the product inoperable and indicating tampering via blinking Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs)
  - Special holographic tampering evident labels on the product's enclosure provide a clear visual indication if the product has been opened or compromised

Belkin secure peripheral sharing devices use multiple isolated microcontrollers (one microcontroller per connected computer) to emulate connected peripherals in order to prevent display signaling, keyboard signaling, and power signaling attacks.

Figure 1 is a simplified block diagram showing the TOE keyboard and mouse data path for two ports. A Host Emulator (HE) communicates with the user keyboard via the USB protocol. The Host Emulator converts user key strokes into unidirectional serial data. That unidirectional serial data is passed through the switch that is used to select between Computer A and Computer B. Isolated Device Emulators (DE) are connected to the data switch on one side and to the respective computers on the other side. Each key stroke is converted by the selected DE into a bi-directional stream to communicate with the computer.





**Figure 1 – Simplified Switching Diagram**

The TOE is a combined software and hardware TOE. A mapping showing the applicable SFRs for each device is included in Annex B.

## 1.4.2 TOE Environment

The following components are required for operation of the TOE in the evaluated configuration.


Component	Description
Connected Computers	2-4 General purpose computers
Mouse	General purpose USB mouse
Keyboard	General purpose USB keyboard
Audio output device	Analog audio output device (speakers or headphones)
User display	Standard computer display (HDMI 2.0, or DisplayPort 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3)

Component	Description
Belkin KVM Cables	USB Type-A to USB Type-B (mouse) Video cable (DisplayPort or HDMI) 3.5mm stereo cable (Audio cable)

**Table 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software**

## 1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION

### 1.5.1 Evaluated Configuration



**Figure 2 – KVM Switch Evaluated Configuration**

Figure 2 shows a basic evaluated configuration. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is connected to two, or four computers. The video input is DisplayPort or HDMI, and one or two displays are connected. The peripheral sharing device is connected to speakers or headphones.

## 1.5.2 Physical Scope

The TOE consists of the devices shown in Table 2.

Family	Family Description	Part Number	Model	Active Anti-tampering	Tamper Evident labels	Analog Audio	Video in	Video out	Number of supported displays	KM
Universal 2nd Generation Secure KVMs without DPP KVM Devices	KVM devices with active anti-tampering, and analog audio.	CGA18346	F1DN104KVM-UNN4	Yes	Yes	Yes	DP/HDMI	DP/HDMI	1	Yes
		CGA18349	F1DN204KVM-UNN4	Yes	Yes	Yes	DP/HDMI	DP/HDMI	2	Yes
		CGA18345	F1DN102KVM-UNN4	Yes	Yes	Yes	DP/HDMI	DP/HDMI	1	Yes
		CGA18347	F1DN202KVM-UNN4	Yes	Yes	Yes	DP/HDMI	DP/HDMI	2	Yes
		CGA28573	F1DN102KVM-HA-4	Yes	Yes	Yes	DP/HDMI	DP/HDMI	1	Yes
		CGA28574	F1DN202KVM-HA-4	Yes	Yes	Yes	DP/HDMI	DP/HDMI	2	Yes
		CGA28575	F1DN104KVM-HA-4	Yes	Yes	Yes	DP/HDMI	DP/HDMI	1	Yes
		CGA28576	F1DN204KVM-HA-4	Yes	Yes	Yes	DP/HDMI	DP/HDMI	2	Yes

**Table 2 – TOE Peripheral Sharing Devices and Features**

### 1.5.2.1 TOE Delivery

The TOE, together with its corresponding cables are delivered to the customer via trusted carrier, such as Fed-Ex, that provide a tracking service for all shipments.

### 1.5.2.2 TOE Guidance

The TOE includes the following guidance documentation:

- Quick Installation Guide 2/4 Port Secure Single/Dual-Head DP/HDMI-DP/HDMI KVM Switches, 8820-02951 Rev.A00
  - [https://s3.belkin.com/support/assets/belkin/qig/Quick%20Installation%20Guide%202\\_4%20Port%20Secure%20Single\\_Dual-Head%20DP\\_HDMI-DP\\_HDMI%20KVM%20Switches%2C%208820-02951%20Rev.A00.pdf](https://s3.belkin.com/support/assets/belkin/qig/Quick%20Installation%20Guide%202_4%20Port%20Secure%20Single_Dual-Head%20DP_HDMI-DP_HDMI%20KVM%20Switches%2C%208820-02951%20Rev.A00.pdf)
- Quick Installation Guide 2/4/8 Port SKVM USB Keyboard with Lighting, 8820-02953 Rev.B00
  - [https://s3.belkin.com/support/assets/belkin/qig/Quick%20Installation%20Guide%202\\_4\\_8%20Port%20SKVM%20USB%20Keyboard%20with%20Lighting%2C%208820-02953%20Rev.B00.pdf](https://s3.belkin.com/support/assets/belkin/qig/Quick%20Installation%20Guide%202_4_8%20Port%20SKVM%20USB%20Keyboard%20with%20Lighting%2C%208820-02953%20Rev.B00.pdf)
- Belkin Regulatory Information, 8820-02969 Rev. A00
  - <https://s3.belkin.com/support/assets/belkin/others/Belkin%20Regulatory%20Information%2C%208820-02969%20Rev.%20A00.pdf>
- Belkin SKVM/SKM Administration Guide, LNKPG-00666 Rev. B00
  - <https://s3.belkin.com/support/assets/belkin/others/Belkin%20SKVMSKM%20Administration%20Guide%2C%20LNKPG-00666%20Rev.%20B00.pdf>

Guidance may be downloaded from the Belkin website ([www.belkin.com](http://www.belkin.com)) in .pdf format from the indicated locations.

The following guidance is available upon request by emailing [KVM\\_Support@belkin.com](mailto:KVM_Support@belkin.com):

- Belkin F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4, F1DN102KVM-HA-4, F1DN202KVM-HA-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 2.0

### 1.5.3 Logical Scope

The logical boundary of the TOE includes all interfaces and functions within the physical boundary. The logical boundary of the TOE may be broken down by the security function classes described in Section 6. Table 3 summarizes the logical scope of the TOE.

<b>Functional Classes</b>	<b>Description</b>
User Data Protection	The TOE provides secure switching capabilities for keyboard and mouse, display, and audio output. The TOE ensures that only authorized peripheral devices may be used.
Protection of the TSF <sup>1</sup>	The TOE ensures a secure state in the case of failure, provides only restricted access, and performs self-testing. The TOE provides both passive detection of physical attack, and active resistance to attack.
TOE Access	The TOE provides a continuous indication of which computer is currently selected.

**Table 3 – Logical Scope of the TOE**

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<sup>1</sup> TOE Security Functionality

## 2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

### 2.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM

This Security Target claims to be conformant to Version 3.1 of Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation according to:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components; CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017

As follows:

- CC Part 2 extended
- CC Part 3 conformant

The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 has been taken into account.

### 2.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE CLAIM

This ST claims exact conformance with the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices [CFG\_PSD-AO-KM-VI\_V1.0], which references the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 [PP\_PSD\_V4.0] and the modules listed in Section 2.4. The Technical Decisions in Table 4 apply to the PP and the modules and have been accounted for in the ST and in the evaluation.

Technical Decision	PP or Module
TD0506	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
TD0507	[MOD_KM_V1.0]
TD0514	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
TD0518	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
TD0539	[MOD_VI_V1.0]

Technical Decision	PP or Module
TD0557	[MOD_AO_V1.0]
TD0583	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
TD0584	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
TD0585	[MOD_AO_V1.0]
TD0586	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
TD0593	[MOD_AO_V1.0], [MOD_KM_V1.0], [MOD_VI_V1.0]

**Table 4 – Applicable Technical Decisions**

## 2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM

This Security Target does not claim conformance with any package.

## 2.4 MODULE CLAIM

The following PP-Modules are specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP:

- PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0
- PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0
- PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0

## 2.5 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE

The TOE Keyboard, Video, Mouse (KVM) switches are inherently consistent with the Compliant Targets of Evaluation described in the [PP\_PSD\_V4.0] and in the PP modules listed in Section 2.4, and with the PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices [CFG\_PSD-AO-KM-VI\_V1.0].

The security problem definition, statement of security objectives and statement of security requirements in this ST conform exactly to the security problem definition, statement of security objectives and statement of security requirements contained in [PP\_PSD\_V4.0] and the modules listed in Section 2.4.

## 3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

### 3.1 THREATS

Table 5 lists the threats described in Section 3.1 of the [PP\_PSD\_V4.0] and [MOD\_AO\_V1.0]. Mitigation to the threats is through the objectives identified in Section 4.1, Security Objectives for the TOE.

Threat	Description
<b>T.DATA_LEAK</b>	A connection via the PSD between one or more computers may allow unauthorized data flow through the PSD or its connected peripherals.
<b>T.SIGNAL_LEAK</b>	A connection via the PSD between one or more computers may allow unauthorized data flow through bit-by-bit signaling.
<b>T.RESIDUAL_LEAK</b>	A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data between the intended connected computer and another unintended connected computer.
<b>T.UNINTENDED_USE</b>	A PSD may connect the user to a computer other than the one to which the user intended to connect.
<b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES</b>	The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a specific PSD peripheral port may allow unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSD or its connected computers.
<b>T.LOGICAL_TAMPER</b>	An attached device (computer or peripheral) with malware, or otherwise under the control of a malicious user, could modify or overwrite code or data stored in the PSD's volatile or non-volatile memory to allow unauthorized information flows.
<b>T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER</b>	A malicious user or human agent could physically modify the PSD to allow unauthorized information flows.
<b>T.REPLACEMENT</b>	A malicious human agent could replace the PSD during shipping, storage, or use with an alternate device that does not enforce the PSD security policies.
<b>T.FAILED</b>	Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an unauthorized information flow or weakening of PSD security functions.



Threat	Description
<b>T.MICROPHONE_USE</b>	A malicious agent could use an unauthorized peripheral device such as a microphone, connected to the TOE audio out peripheral device interface to eavesdrop or transfer data across an air-gap through audio signaling.
<b>T.AUDIO_REVERSED</b>	A malicious agent could repurpose an authorized audio output peripheral device by converting it to a low-gain microphone to eavesdrop on the surrounding audio or transfer data across an air-gap through audio signaling.

**Table 5 – Threats**

## 3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES

There are no Organizational Security Policies applicable to this TOE.

## 3.3 ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions required to ensure the security of the TOE are listed in Table 6.

Assumptions	Description
<b>A.NO_TEMPEST</b>	Computers and peripheral devices connected to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.  The TSF may or may not isolate the ground of the keyboard and mouse computer interfaces (the USB ground). The Operational Environment is assumed not to support TEMPEST red-black ground isolation.
<b>A.PHYSICAL</b>	The environment provides physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it processes and contains.
<b>A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES</b>	The environment includes no wireless peripheral devices.
<b>A.TRUSTED_ADMIN</b>	PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
<b>A.TRUSTED_CONFIG</b>	Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational environment follow the applicable security configuration guidance.

<b>Assumptions</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS</b>	All PSD users are allowed to interact with all connected computers. It is not the role of the PSD to prevent or otherwise control user access to connected computers. Computers or their connected network shall have the required means to authenticate the user and to control access to their various resources.
<b>A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES</b>	The computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special analog data collection cards or peripherals such as analog to digital interface, high performance audio interface, digital signal processing function, or analog video capture function.
<b>A.NO_MICROPHONES</b>	Users are trained not to connect a microphone to the TOE audio output interface.

**Table 6 – Assumptions**

## 4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the security objectives is to address the security concerns and to show which security concerns are addressed by the TOE, and which are addressed by the environment. Threats may be addressed by the TOE or the security environment or both. Therefore, the CC identifies two categories of security objectives:

- Security objectives for the TOE
- Security objectives for the environment

### 4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE

This section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to be addressed by the TOE, and traces each Security Functional Requirement (SFR) back to a security objective of the TOE.

Security Objective	Description						
<b>O.COMPUTER _INTERFACE _ISOLATION</b>	<p>The PSD shall prevent unauthorized data flow to ensure that the PSD and its connected peripheral devices cannot be exploited in an attempt to leak data. The TOE-Computer interface shall be isolated from all other PSD-Computer interfaces while TOE is powered.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="605 1108 1438 1402"> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1108 764 1205">MOD_AO</td> <td data-bbox="764 1108 1438 1205">FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1205 764 1272">MOD_VI</td> <td data-bbox="764 1205 1438 1272">FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1272 764 1402">MOD_KM</td> <td data-bbox="764 1272 1438 1402">FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1	MOD_VI	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1	MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3
MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1						
MOD_VI	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1						
MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3						
<b>O.COMPUTER _INTERFACE _ISOLATION _TOE_UNPOWERED</b>	<p>The PSD shall not allow data to transit a PSD-Computer interface while the PSD is unpowered.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="605 1549 1438 1843"> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1549 764 1646">MOD_AO</td> <td data-bbox="764 1549 1438 1646">FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1646 764 1713">MOD_VI</td> <td data-bbox="764 1646 1438 1713">FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1713 764 1843">MOD_KM</td> <td data-bbox="764 1713 1438 1843">FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1	MOD_VI	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1	MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3
MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1						
MOD_VI	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1						
MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3						
<b>O.USER_DATA _ISOLATION</b>	<p>The PSD shall route user data, such as keyboard entries, only to the computer selected by the user. The PSD shall provide</p>						

Security Objective	Description						
	<p>isolation between the data flowing from the peripheral device to the selected computer and any non-selected computer.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="605 432 1442 718"> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 432 768 527">MOD_AO</td> <td data-bbox="768 432 1442 527">FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 527 768 594">MOD_VI</td> <td data-bbox="768 527 1442 594">FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 594 768 718">MOD_KM</td> <td data-bbox="768 594 1442 718">FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1	MOD_VI	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1	MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3
MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1						
MOD_VI	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1						
MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3						
<p><b>O.NO_USER_DATA_RETENTION</b></p>	<p>The PSD shall not retain user data in non-volatile memory after power up or, if supported, factory reset.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="605 871 1442 995"> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 871 768 938">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="768 871 1442 938">FDP_RIP_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 938 768 995">MOD_KM</td> <td data-bbox="768 938 1442 995">FDP_RIP.1/KM</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FDP_RIP_EXT.1	MOD_KM	FDP_RIP.1/KM		
PP_PSD	FDP_RIP_EXT.1						
MOD_KM	FDP_RIP.1/KM						
<p><b>O.NO_OTHER_EXTERNAL_INTERFACES</b></p>	<p>The PSD shall not have any external interfaces other than those implemented by the TSF.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="605 1150 1442 1209"> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1150 768 1209">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="768 1150 1442 1209">FDP_PDC_EXT.1</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FDP_PDC_EXT.1				
PP_PSD	FDP_PDC_EXT.1						
<p><b>O.LEAK_PREVENTION_SWITCHING</b></p>	<p>The PSD shall ensure that there are no switching mechanisms that allow signal data leakage between connected computers.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="605 1360 1442 1419"> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1360 768 1419">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="768 1360 1442 1419">FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2				
PP_PSD	FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2						
<p><b>O.AUTHORIZED_USAGE</b></p>	<p>The TOE shall explicitly prohibit or ignore unauthorized switching mechanisms, either because it supports only one connected computer or because it allows only authorized mechanisms to switch between connected computers. Authorized switching mechanisms shall require express user action restricted to console buttons, console switches, console touch screen, wired remote control, and peripheral devices using a guard. Unauthorized switching mechanisms include keyboard shortcuts, also known as "hotkeys," automatic port scanning, control through a connected computer, and control through keyboard shortcuts. Where applicable, the results of the switching activity shall be indicated by the TSF so that it is clear to the user that the switching mechanism was engaged as intended.</p>						

Security Objective	Description								
	<p>A conformant TOE may also provide a management function to configure some aspects of the TSF. If the TOE provides this functionality, it shall ensure that whatever management functions it provides can only be performed by authorized administrators and that an audit trail of management activities is generated.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="605 562 1442 821"> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 562 764 657">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="764 562 1442 657">FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FTA_CIN_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 657 764 751">MOD_VI</td> <td data-bbox="764 657 1442 751">FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1), FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2), FTA_CIN_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 751 764 821">MOD_KM</td> <td data-bbox="764 751 1442 821">FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FTA_CIN_EXT.1	MOD_VI	FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1), FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2), FTA_CIN_EXT.1	MOD_KM	FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM		
PP_PSD	FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FTA_CIN_EXT.1								
MOD_VI	FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1), FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2), FTA_CIN_EXT.1								
MOD_KM	FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM								
<p><b>O.PERIPHERAL_PORTS_ISOLATION</b></p>	<p>The PSD shall ensure that data does not flow between peripheral devices connected to different PSD interfaces.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="605 968 1442 1262"> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 968 764 1062">MOD_AO</td> <td data-bbox="764 968 1442 1062">FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1062 764 1136">MOD_VI</td> <td data-bbox="764 1062 1442 1136">FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1136 764 1262">MOD_KM</td> <td data-bbox="764 1136 1442 1262">FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1	MOD_VI	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1	MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3		
MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1								
MOD_VI	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1								
MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3								
<p><b>O.REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_PERIPHERAL</b></p>	<p>The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral device types and protocols.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="605 1409 1442 1858"> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1409 764 1472">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="764 1409 1442 1472">FDP_PDC_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1472 764 1566">MOD_AO</td> <td data-bbox="764 1472 1442 1566">FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1566 764 1703">MOD_VI</td> <td data-bbox="764 1566 1442 1703">FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI, FDP_IPC_EXT.1, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="605 1703 764 1858">MOD_KM</td> <td data-bbox="764 1703 1442 1858">FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1	MOD_VI	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI, FDP_IPC_EXT.1, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI	MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM
PP_PSD	FDP_PDC_EXT.1								
MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO, FDP_PUD_EXT.1								
MOD_VI	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI, FDP_IPC_EXT.1, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI								
MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM								

Security Objective	Description				
<p><b>O.REJECT _UNAUTHORIZED _ENDPOINTS</b></p>	<p>The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral devices connected via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) hub.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 447 1440 642"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 447 764 512">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="764 447 1440 512">FDP_PDC_EXT.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 512 764 642">MOD_KM</td> <td data-bbox="764 512 1440 642">FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3
PP_PSD	FDP_PDC_EXT.1				
MOD_KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.3				
<p><b>O.NO_TOE_ACCESS</b></p>	<p>The PSD firmware, software, and memory shall not be accessible via its external ports.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 789 1440 856"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 789 764 856">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="764 789 1440 856">FPT_NTA_EXT.1</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FPT_NTA_EXT.1		
PP_PSD	FPT_NTA_EXT.1				
<p><b>O.TAMPER _EVIDENT _LABEL</b></p>	<p>The PSD shall be identifiable as authentic by the user and the user must be made aware of any procedures or other such information to accomplish authentication. This feature must be available upon receipt of the PSD and continue to be available during the PSD deployment. The PSD shall be labeled with at least one visible unique identifying tamper-evident marking that can be used to authenticate the device. The PSD manufacturer must maintain a complete list of manufactured PSD articles and their respective identification markings' unique identifiers.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 1262 1440 1325"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 1262 764 1325">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="764 1262 1440 1325">FPT_PHP.1</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FPT_PHP.1		
PP_PSD	FPT_PHP.1				
<p><b>O.ANTI_TAMPERING</b></p>	<p>The PSD shall be physically enclosed so that any attempts to open or otherwise access the internals or modify the connections of the PSD would be evident, and optionally thwarted through disablement of the TOE. Note: This applies to a wired remote control as well as the main chassis of the PSD.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 1602 1440 1665"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 1602 764 1665">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="764 1602 1440 1665">FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.3</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.3		
PP_PSD	FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.3				
<p><b>O.SELF_TEST</b></p>	<p>The PSD shall perform self-tests following power up or powered reset.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 1812 1440 1873"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 1812 764 1873">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="764 1812 1440 1873">FPT_TST.1</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FPT_TST.1		
PP_PSD	FPT_TST.1				

Security Objective	Description		
<b>O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_TOE_DISABLE</b>	<p>The PSD shall enter a secure state upon detection of a critical failure.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 449 1438 512"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 449 764 512">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="764 449 1438 512">FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1
PP_PSD	FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1		
<b>O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_INDICATION</b>	<p>The PSD shall provide clear and visible user indications in the case of a self-test failure.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 659 1438 722"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 659 764 722">PP_PSD</td> <td data-bbox="764 659 1438 722">FPT_TST_EXT.1</td> </tr> </table>	PP_PSD	FPT_TST_EXT.1
PP_PSD	FPT_TST_EXT.1		
<b>O.PROTECTED_EDID</b>	<p>The TOE shall read the connected display Extended Display Identification Data (EDID) once during the TOE power up or reboot sequence and prevent any EDID channel write transactions that connected computers initiate.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 936 1438 1033"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 936 764 1033">MOD_VI</td> <td data-bbox="764 936 1438 1033">FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_VI	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI
MOD_VI	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI		
<b>O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_VIDEO</b>	<p>The TOE shall enforce unidirectional video data flow from the connected computer video interface to the display interface only.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 1213 1438 1276"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 1213 764 1276">MOD_VI</td> <td data-bbox="764 1213 1438 1276">FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_VI	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI
MOD_VI	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI		
<b>O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT</b>	<p>The PSD shall enforce the unidirectional flow of audio data from the analog audio computer interface to the analog audio peripheral interface.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 1457 1438 1554"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 1457 764 1554">MOD_AO</td> <td data-bbox="764 1457 1438 1554">FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_AFL_EXT.1, FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_AFL_EXT.1, FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO
MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_AFL_EXT.1, FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO		
<b>O.COMPUTER_TO_AUDIO_ISOLATION</b>	<p>The PSD shall isolate the analog audio output function from all other TOE functions.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="607 1701 1438 1755"> <tr> <td data-bbox="607 1701 764 1755">MOD_AO</td> <td data-bbox="764 1701 1438 1755">FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO
MOD_AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO, FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO		

Security Objective	Description		
<b>O.EMULATED_INPUT</b>	<p>The TOE shall emulate the keyboard and/or mouse functions from the TOE to the connected computer.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>MOD_KM</td> <td>FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_KM	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM
MOD_KM	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM		
<b>O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_INPUT</b>	<p>The TOE shall enforce unidirectional keyboard and/or mouse device's data flow from the peripheral device to only the selected computer.</p> <p>Addressed by:</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>MOD_KM</td> <td>FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM</td> </tr> </table>	MOD_KM	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM
MOD_KM	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM		

Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE

## 4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

This section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to be addressed by the IT environment or by non-technical or procedural means.

Security Objective	Description
<b>OE.NO_TEMPEST</b>	The operational environment will not use TEMPEST approved equipment.
<b>OE.PHYSICAL</b>	The operational environment will provide physical security, commensurate with the value of the PSD and the data that transits it.
<b>OE.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES</b>	The operational environment will not include wireless keyboards, mice, audio, user authentication, or video devices.
<b>OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN</b>	The operational environment will ensure that trusted PSD Administrators and users are appropriately trained.
<b>OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG</b>	The operational environment will ensure that administrators configuring the PSD and its operational environment follow the applicable security configuration guidance.



Security Objective	Description
<b>OE.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES</b>	The operational environment will not have special analog data collection cards or peripherals such as analog to digital interface, high performance audio interface, or a component with digital signal processing or analog video capture functions.
<b>OE.NO_MICROPHONES</b>	The operational environment is expected to ensure that microphones are not plugged into the TOE audio output interfaces.

**Table 8 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

## 4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE

The security objectives rationale describes how the assumptions and threats map to the security objectives.

Threat or Assumption	Security Objective(s)	Rationale
T.DATA_LEAK	O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE_ISOLATION	Isolation of computer interfaces prevents data from leaking between them without authorization.
	O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE_ISOLATION_TOE_UNPOWERED	Maintaining interface isolation while the TOE is in an unpowered state ensures that data cannot leak between computer interfaces.
	O.USER_DATA_ISOLATION	The TOE's routing of data only to the selected computer ensures that it will not leak to any others.
	O.NO_OTHER_EXTERNAL_INTERFACES	The absence of additional external interfaces ensures that there is no unexpected method by which data can be leaked.
	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_INPUT	The TOE's enforcement of unidirectional input for keyboard/mouse data prevents leakage of computer data through a connected peripheral interface.
	O.PERIPHERAL_PORTS_ISOLATION	Isolation of peripheral ports prevents data from leaking between them without authorization.

Threat or Assumption	Security Objective(s)	Rationale
	O.PROTECTED_EDID	The TOE's protection of the EDID interface prevents its use as a vector for unauthorized data leakage via this channel.
	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_VIDEO	The TOE's enforcement of unidirectional output for video data protects against data leakage via connected computers by ensuring that no video data can be input to a connected computer through this interface.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK	O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE_ISOLATION	Isolation of computer interfaces prevents data leakage through bit-wise signaling because there is no mechanism by which the signal data can be communicated.
	O.NO_OTHER_EXTERNAL_INTERFACES	The absence of additional external interfaces ensures that there is no unexpected method by which data can be leaked through bitwise signaling.
	O.LEAK_PREVENTION_SWITCHING	The TOE's use of switching methods that are not susceptible to signal leakage helps mitigate the signal leak threat.
	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_INPUT	The TOE's enforcement of unidirectional input for keyboard/mouse data prevents leakage of computer data through bit-by-bit signaling to a connected peripheral interface.
	O.PROTECTED_EDID	The TOE's protection of the EDID interface prevents its use as a vector for bit-by-bit signal leakage via this channel.
	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_VIDEO	The TOE's enforcement of unidirectional output for video data protects against signaling leakage via connected computers by ensuring that no video data can be input to a connected computer through this interface.

Threat or Assumption	Security Objective(s)	Rationale
	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT mitigates this threat by preventing the exploitation of the analog audio output to receive signaled data from a connected computer. Analog audio output in standard computers may be exploited to become audio input in some audio codecs. Audio devices such as headphones may also be used as low-gain dynamic microphones. If the TOE design assures that analog audio reverse signal attenuation is below the noise floor level then the audio signal may not be recovered from the resultant audio stream. This prevents potential misuse of headphones connected to the TOE for audio eavesdropping.
	O.COMPUTER_TO_AUDIO_ISOLATION	O.COMPUTER_TO_AUDIO_ISOLATION mitigates this threat by ensuring that analog audio output converted to input by a malicious driver cannot pick up signals from other computer interfaces. A TOE design that ensures that audio signals are not leaked to any other TOE interface can effectively prevent a potential signaling leakage across the TOE through analog audio.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK	O.NO_USER_DATA_RETENTION	The TOE's lack of data retention ensures that a residual data leak is not possible.
	O.PROTECTED_EDID	The TOE's protection of the EDID interface prevents the leakage of residual data by ensuring that no such data can be written to EDID memory.
T.UNINTENDED_USE	O.AUTHORIZED_USAGE	The TOE's support for only switching mechanisms that require explicit user action to engage ensures that a user has sufficient information to avoid interacting with an unintended computer.

Threat or Assumption	Security Objective(s)	Rationale
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES	O.REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_ENDPOINTS	The TOE's ability to reject unauthorized endpoints mitigates the threat of unauthorized devices being used to communicate with connected computers.
	O.REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_PERIPHERAL	The TOE's ability to reject unauthorized peripherals mitigates the threat of unauthorized devices being used to communicate with connected computers.
	O.EMULATED_INPUT	The TOE's emulation of keyboard/mouse data input ensures that a connected computer will only receive this specific type of data through a connected peripheral.
	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_VIDEO	The TOE's limitation of supported video protocol interfaces prevents the connection of unauthorized devices.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER	O.NO_TOE_ACCESS	The TOE's prevention of logical access to its firmware, software, and memory mitigates the threat of logical tampering.
	O.EMULATED_INPUT	The TOE's emulation of keyboard/mouse data input prevents logical tampering of the TSF ensuring that only known inputs to it are supported.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER	O.ANTI_TAMPERING	The TOE mitigates the threat of physical tampering through use of an enclosure that provides tamper detection functionality.
	O.TAMPER_EVIDENT_LABEL	The TOE mitigates the threat of physical tampering through use of tamper evident labels that reveal physical tampering attempts.

Threat or Assumption	Security Objective(s)	Rationale
T.REPLACEMENT	O.TAMPER_EVIDENT_LABEL	The TOE's use of a tamper evident label that provides authenticity of the device mitigates the threat that it is substituted for a replacement device during the acquisition process.
T.FAILED	O.SELF_TEST	The TOE mitigates the threat of failures leading to compromise of security functions through self-tests of its own functionality.
	O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_TOE_DISABLE	The TOE mitigates the threat of failures leading to compromise of security functions by disabling all data flows in the event a failure is detected.
	O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_INDICATION	The TOE mitigates the threat of failures leading to compromise of security functions by providing users with a clear indication when it is in a failure state and should not be trusted.
T.MICROPHONE_USE	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT mitigates this threat by attenuating the strength of any inbound transmission of audio data through the TOE from a connected peripheral. If the TOE design ensures that analog audio reverse signal attenuation is below the noise floor level then any audio signal should not have sufficient strength to be usable.
T.AUDIO_REVERSED	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT	O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT mitigates this threat by ensuring that the TOE's audio peripheral interface(s) are exclusively used to output audio.
A.NO_TEMPEST	OE.NO_TEMPEST	If the TOE's operational environment does not include TEMPEST approved equipment, then the assumption is satisfied.
A.NO_PHYSICAL	OE.PHYSICAL	If the TOE's operational environment provides physical security, then the assumption is satisfied.

Threat or Assumption	Security Objective(s)	Rationale
A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES	OE.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES	If the TOE's operational environment does not include wireless peripherals, then the assumption is satisfied.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN	OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN	If the TOE's operational environment ensures that only trusted administrators will manage the TSF, then the assumption is satisfied.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG	OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG	If TOE administrators follow the provided security configuration guidance, then the assumption is satisfied.
A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS	OE.PHYSICAL	If the TOE's operational environment provides physical access to connected computers, then the assumption is satisfied.
A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES	OE.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES	If administrators in the TOE's operational environment take care to ensure that computers with special analog data collection interfaces are not connected to the TOE, then the assumption that such components are not present is satisfied.
A.NO_MICROPHONES	OE.NO_MICROPHONES	The assumption is upheld by the objective since the users in the environment are trained not to connect a microphone to the TOE audio output interface,

**Table 9 – Security Objectives Rationale**

## 5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION

The extended components definition is presented in Appendix C of the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device [PP\_PSD\_V4.0] and in the modules for analog audio output devices [MOD\_AO\_V1.0], keyboard/mouse devices [MOD\_KM\_V1.0], and display devices [MOD\_VI\_1.0]. It is repeated here to ensure the completeness of this ST.

The families to which these components belong are identified in the following table:

Functional Class	Functional Families
User Data Protection (FDP)	FDP_AFL_EXT Audio Filtration
	FDP_APC_EXT Active PSD Connections
	FDP_CDS_EXT Connected Displays Supported
	FDP_FIL_EXT Device Filtering
	FDP_IPC_EXT Internal Protocol Conversion
	FDP_PDC_EXT Peripheral Device Connection
	FDP_PUD_EXT Powering Unauthorized Devices
	FDP_RDR_EXT Re-Enumeration Device Rejection
	FDP_RIP_EXT Residual Information Protection
	FDP_SPR_EXT Sub-Protocol Rules
	FDP_SWI_EXT PSD Switching
FDP_UDF_EXT Unidirectional Data Flow	
Protection of the TSF (FPT)	FPT_FLS_EXT Failure with Preservation of Secure State
	FPT_NTA_EXT No Access to TOE
	FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing
TOE Access (FTA)	FTA_CIN_EXT Continuous Indications

**Table 10 – Functional Families of Extended Components**


## 5.1 CLASS FDP: USER DATA PROTECTION

### 5.1.1 FDP\_AFL\_EXT Audio Filtration

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define the requirements for device filtering.

#### Component Leveling



FDP\_AFL\_EXT.1 Audio Filtration, requires the TSF to enforce outgoing audio filtration levels.

#### Management: FDP\_AFL\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FDP\_AFL\_EXT.1

No specific audit functions are defined.

#### FDP\_AFL\_EXT.1 Device Filtering

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection

**FDP\_AFL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall ensure outgoing audio signals are filtered as per [assignment: document reference to the table below].

Frequency (kHz)	Minimum Attenuation (dB)	Maximum Voltage After Attenuation
14	23.9	127.65 mV
15	26.4	95.73 mV
16	30.8	57.68 mV
17	35.0	35.57 mV
18	38.8	22.96 mV
19	43.0	14.15 mV
20	46.0	10.02 mV
30	71.4	0.53 mV




Frequency (kHz)	Minimum Attenuation (dB)	Maximum Voltage After Attenuation
40	71.4	0.53 mV
50	71.4	0.53 mV
60	71.4	0.53 mV

## 5.1.2 FDP\_APC\_EXT Active PSD Connections

### Family Behavior

Components in this family define the requirements for when an external interface to the TOE is authorized to transmit data related to peripheral sharing.

### Component Leveling



FDP\_APC\_EXT.1 Active PSD Connections, restricts the flow of data through the TSF.

### Management: FDP\_APC\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FDP\_APC\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FDP\_APC\_EXT.1 Active PSD Connections

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall route user data only to or from the interfaces selected by the user.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall ensure that no data flows between connected computers whether the TOE is powered on or powered off.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off.


**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is in a failure state.

### 5.1.3 FDP\_CDS\_EXT Connected Displays Supported

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the number of display interfaces contained within the TOE.

#### Component Leveling



FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1, Connected Displays Supported, requires the TSF to define whether it supports one connected display at a time or multiple connected displays simultaneously.

#### Management: FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1

There are no specific management functions identified.

#### Audit: FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1 Connected Displays Supported

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components


**FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall support [*selection: one connected display, multiple connected displays*] at a time.

### 5.1.4 FDP\_FIL\_EXT Device Filtering

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define the requirements for device filtering.

#### Component Leveling



FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1 Device Filtering, requires the TSF to specify the method of device filtering used for peripheral interfaces and defines requirements for handling whitelists and blacklists.

#### Management: FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Ability to configure whitelist/blacklist members

### **Audit: FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Configuration of whitelist/blacklist members

### **FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1 Device Filtering**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection

**FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall have [*selection: configurable, fixed*] device filtering for [*assignment: list of supported peripheral interface types*] interfaces.

**FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall consider all [*assignment: blacklist name*] blacklisted devices as unauthorized devices for [*assignment: list of supported peripheral interface types*] interfaces in peripheral device connections.


**FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall consider all [*assignment: whitelist name*] whitelisted devices as authorized devices for peripheral device connections only if they are not on the [*assignment: blacklist name*] blacklist or otherwise unauthorized.

## **5.1.5 FDP\_IPC\_EXT Internal Protocol Conversion**

### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define requirements for the TOE's ability to convert one protocol into another for internal processing.

### **Component Leveling**



FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1, Internal Protocol Conversion, requires the TSF to specify an input protocol that the TOE receives, the protocol that the TSF converts it to, and whether the data is output from the TOE as the original protocol or as the converted one.

### **Management: FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1**

There are no specific management functions identified.

### **Audit: FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1 Internal Protocol Conversion**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2 Authorized Connection Protocols

**FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall convert the [*assignment: original protocol*] protocol at the [*assignment: TOE external interface(s)*] into the [*assignment: converted protocol*] protocol within the TOE.

**FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall output the [*assignment: converted protocol*] protocol from inside the TOE to [*assignment: TOE external interface(s)*] as [*selection: [assignment: original protocol] protocol*], [*assignment: converted protocol*] protocol].


## **5.1.6 FDP\_PDC\_EXT Peripheral Device Connection**

### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define the requirements for peripheral device connections.

This family is defined in the PSD PP. This PP-Modules [MOD\_KM\_V1.0] and [MOD\_VI\_V1.0] augment the extended family by adding two additional components, FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2 and FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3. The new components and their impact on the extended family's component leveling are shown below; reference the PSD PP for all other definitions for this family.

### **Component Leveling**



FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection, requires the TSF to limit external connections to only authorized devices.

FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2 Authorized Devices, defines the types of physical devices that the TSF will permit to connect to it.

FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3, Authorized Connection Protocols, defines the protocols that the TSF will authorize over its physical/logical interfaces, as well as any rules that are applicable to these interfaces.

### **Management: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1, FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2, FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3**

No specific management functions are identified.

#### **Audit: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Acceptance or rejection of a peripheral

#### **Audit: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2, FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3**

There are no specific auditable events foreseen.

### **FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall reject connections with unauthorized devices upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall reject connections with devices presenting unauthorized interface protocols upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.3** The TOE shall have no external interfaces other than those claimed by the TSF.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.4** The TOE shall not have wireless interfaces.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.5** The TOE shall provide a visual or auditory indication to the User when a peripheral is rejected.

### **FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2 Authorized Devices**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices as defined in [*assignment: devices specified in the PP or PP-Module in which this SFR is defined*] and [*assignment: devices specified in another PP or PP-Module that shares a PP Configuration with the PP or PP-Module in which this SFR is defined*] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in [*assignment: devices specified in the PP or PP Module in which this SFR is defined*] and [*assignment: devices specified in another PP or PP-Module that shares a PP-Configuration with the PP or PP-Module in which this SFR is defined*] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

### **FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3 Authorized Connection Protocols**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall have interfaces for the [*assignment: list of supported protocols associated with physical and/or logical TSF interfaces*] protocols.


**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported protocols: [*assignment: rules defining the handling for communications over this protocol (e.g. any processing that must be done by the TSF prior to transmitting it through the TOE, circumstances or frequency with which the protocol is invoked)*].

## **5.1.7 FDP\_PUD\_EXT Powering Unauthorized Devices**

### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define the requirements for unauthorized device powering.

### **Component Leveling**



FDP\_PUD\_EXT.1 Powering Unauthorized Devices, requires the TSF to not power any unauthorized devices connected to the peripheral interface.

### **Management: FDP\_PUD\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FDP\_PUD\_EXT.1**

There are no specific auditable events foreseen.

### **FDP\_PUD\_EXT.1 Powering Unauthorized Devices**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection

**FDP\_PUD\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall not provide power to any unauthorized device connected to the analog audio peripheral interface.

## **5.1.8 FDP\_RDR\_EXT Re-Enumeration Device Rejection**

### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define requirements to reject device spoofing attempts through reenumeration.

### Component Leveling



FDP\_RDR\_EXT.1 Re-Enumeration Device Rejection, requires the TSF to reject re-enumeration as an unauthorized device.

#### **Management: FDP\_RDR\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

#### **Audit: FDP\_RDR\_EXT.1**

There are no specific auditable events foreseen.

#### **FDP\_RDR\_EXT.1 Re-Enumeration Device Rejection**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection


**FDP\_RDR\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall reject any device that attempts to enumerate again as a different unauthorized device.

## 5.1.9 FDP\_RIP\_EXT Residual Information Protection

### Family Behavior

Components in this family define the requirements for how the TSF prevents data disclosure from its memory.

### Component Leveling



FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1 Residual Information Protection, requires the TSF to prevent the writing of user data to non-volatile memory.

#### **Management: FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Ability to trigger the TSF's purge function

#### **Audit: FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

## FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1 Residual Information Protection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies


**FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that no user data is written to TOE non-volatile memory or storage.

### 5.1.10 FDP\_SPR\_EXT Sub-Protocol Rules

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define the sub-protocols that the TSF allows or blocks depending on the protocols it supports.

#### Component Leveling



FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1 Sub-Protocol Rules, requires the TSF to specify the allowed and blocked sub-protocols based on the protocol it supports.

#### Management: FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1 Sub-Protocol Rules

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3 Authorized Connection Protocols

**FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall apply the following rules for the [assignment: supported protocol] protocol:

- block the following video/display sub-protocols:
  - [assignment: list of blocked sub-protocols]
- allow the following video/display sub-protocols:
  - [assignment: list of allowed sub-protocols].


### 5.1.11 FDP\_SWI\_EXT PSD Switching

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define the requirements for how the TSF protects against inadvertent data switching.



## Component Leveling



FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1 PSD Switching, requires action on the part of a user in order for the TSF's switching mechanisms to be activated.

FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2 PSD Switching Methods, places restrictions on how the TSF's switching mechanisms can be controlled.

FDP\_SWI\_EXT.3 Tied Switching, requires the TSF to ensure that multiple connected peripherals are always switched to the same connected computer.

### **Management: FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1, FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2, FDP\_SWI\_EXT.3**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1, FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2, FDP\_SWI\_EXT.3**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1 PSD Switching**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that [*selection: the TOE supports only one connected computer, switching can be initiated only through express user action*].

### **FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2 PSD Switching Methods**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1 PSD Switching

**FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall ensure that no switching can be initiated through automatic port scanning, control through a connected computer, or control through keyboard shortcuts.

**FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall ensure that switching can be initiated only through express user action using [*selection: console buttons, console switches, console touch screen, wired remote control, peripheral devices using a guard*].

### **FDP\_SWI\_EXT.3 Tied Switching**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1 PSD Switching


**FDP\_SWI\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall ensure that [*assignment: two or more tied peripheral devices*] are always switched together to the same connected computer.

## **5.1.12 FDP\_UDF\_EXT Unidirectional Data Flow**

### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define unidirectional transmission of user data.

### **Component Leveling**



FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1 Unidirectional Data Flow, requires the TSF to provide unidirectional (one-way) communications between a given pair of interface types.

### **Management: FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1 Unidirectional Data Flow**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_APC\_EXT.1 Active PSD Connections

**FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall ensure [*assignment: type of data*] data transits the TOE unidirectionally from the [*assignment: origin point of data*] interface to the [*assignment: destination point of data*] interface.


## **5.2 CLASS FPT: PROTECTION OF THE TSF**

### **5.2.1 FPT\_FLS\_EXT Failure with Preservation of Secure State**

#### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define the secure failure requirements for the TSF.

## Component Leveling



FPT\_FLS\_EXT.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State, requires the TSF to go into a secure state upon the detection of selected failures.

### **Management: FPT\_FLS\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FPT\_FLS\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FPT\_FLS\_EXT.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FPT\_TST.1 TSF Testing  
FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack


**FPT\_FLS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: failure of the power-on self-test and [*selection: failure of the anti-tamper function, no other failures*].

## 5.2.2 FPT\_NTA\_EXT No Access to TOE

### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define what TSF information may be externally accessible.

### **Component Leveling**



FPT\_NTA\_EXT.1 No Access to TOE, requires the TSF to block access to non-authorized TSF data via external ports.

### **Management: FPT\_NTA\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FPT\_NTA\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FPT\_NTA\_EXT.1 No Access to TOE**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies


**FPT\_NTA\_EXT.1.1** TOE firmware, software, and memory shall not be accessible via the TOE's external ports, with the following exceptions: [*selection: the EDID memory of Video TOEs may be accessible from connected computers; the configuration data, settings, and logging data that may be accessible by authorized administrators; no other exceptions*].

## **5.2.3 FPT\_TST\_EXT TSF Testing**

### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define how the TSF responds to a self-test failure.

### **Component Leveling**



FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF Testing, requires the TSF to shutdown normal functions and provide a visual or auditory indication that a self-test has failed.

### **Management: FPT\_TST\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FPT\_TST\_EXT.1**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Indication that the TSF self-test was completed
- Failure of self-test

### **FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF Testing**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FPT\_TST.1 TSF Testing

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall respond to a self-test failure by providing users with a [*selection: visual, auditory*] indication of failure and by shutdown of normal TSF functions.


## **5.3 CLASS FTA: TOE ACCESS**

### **5.3.1 FTA\_CIN\_EXT Continuous Indications**

#### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define how the TSF displays its switching status.

## Component Leveling



FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1 Continuous Indications, requires the TSF to display a visual indication of what computers are selected.

### **Management: FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1 Continuous Indications**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_APC\_EXT.1 Active PSD Connections

**FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall display a visible indication of the selected computers at all times when the TOE is powered.

**FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall implement the visible indication using the following mechanism: **easily visible graphical and/or textual markings of each source video on the display**, [*selection: a button, a panel with lights, a screen with dimming function, a screen with no dimming function, [assignment: description of visible indication]*].

**FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall ensure that while the TOE is powered the current switching status is reflected by [*selection: the indicator, multiple indicators which never display conflicting information*].

## 6 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Section 6 provides security functional and assurance requirements that must be satisfied by a compliant TOE.

### 6.1 CONVENTIONS AND APPLICABILITY

#### 6.1.1 Conventions

The CC permits four types of operations to be performed on functional requirements: selection, assignment, refinement, and iteration. These operations are shown using the same conventions as those in the PSD PP. This is defined in the PP as:

- Assignment: Indicated by surrounding brackets and italics, e.g., [*assigned item*].
- Selection: Indicated by surrounding brackets and italics, e.g., [*selected item*].
- Refinement: Refined components are identified by using **bold** for additional information, or ~~strikeout~~ for deleted text.
- Iteration: Iteration operations for iterations within the Protection Profile and associated modules are identified with a slash (‘/’) and an identifier (e.g. “/KM”).
- Where an SFR does not apply equally to all devices, an additional tag has been added to indicate the products to which the SFR applies. This tag provides the applicable model names in brackets (e.g. FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1(1) Connected Displays Supported (F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, F1DN102KVM-HA-4)). Additionally, a number is appended to the SFR identifier where multiple iterations of the SFR are required.

Extended Security Functional Requirement (SFRs) are identified by the inclusion of “EXT” in the Security Functional Requirement SFR name.

#### 6.1.2 Section Applicability

Table 11 shows the TOE models and the Section 6 Subsections that include the SFRs claimed for that device.

TOE Model	Sections Describing Security Functionality
F1DN104KVM-UNN4 F1DN104KVM-HA-4	Section 6.2 and Section 6.3
F1DN204KVM-UNN4	Section 6.2 and Section 6.4

TOE Model	Sections Describing Security Functionality
F1DN204KVM-HA-4	
F1DN102KVM-UNN4 F1DN102KVM-HA-4	Section 6.2 and Section 6.3
F1DN202KVM-UNN4 F1DN202KVM-HA-4	Section 6.2 and Section 6.4

**Table 11 – Devices and Applicable Sections**

## 6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL DEVICES

Section 6.2 details the security functional requirements that apply to all TOE devices.

Class	Identifier	Name	Source
User Data Protection (FDP)	FDP_AFL_EXT.1	Audio Filtration	[MOD_AO_V1.0]
	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO	Active PSD Connections	[MOD_AO_V1.0]
	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM	Active PSD Connections	[MOD_KM_V1.0]
	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI	Active PSD Connections	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
	FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM	Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse)	[MOD_KM_V1.0]
	FDP_IPC_EXT.1	Internal Protocol Conversion	[MOD_VI_V1.0]

Class	Identifier	Name	Source
	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	Peripheral Device Connection	[PP_PSD_V4.0] [MOD_AO_V1.0] <sup>2</sup> [MOD_VI_V1.0] <sup>3</sup> [MOD_KM_V1.0] <sup>4</sup>
	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO	Peripheral Device Connection (Audio Output)	[MOD_AO_V1.0]
	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM	Authorized Devices (Keyboard/Mouse)	[MOD_KM_V1.0]
	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI	Authorized Devices (Video Output)	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
	FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM	Authorized Connection Protocols (Keyboard/Mouse)	[MOD_KM_V1.0]
	FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI	Authorized Connection Protocols (Video Output)	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
	FDP_PUD_EXT.1	Powering Unauthorized Devices	[MOD_AO_V1.0]
	FDP_RDR_EXT.1	Re-Enumeration Device Rejection	[MOD_KM_V1.0]
	FDP_RIP_EXT.1	Residual Information Protection	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
	FDP_RIP.1/KM	Residual Information Protection (Keyboard Data)	[MOD_KM_V1.0]

<sup>2</sup> There is no modification to this SFR in the [MOD\_AO\_V1.0]. However, there are additions to the Peripheral Device Connections associated with this SFR and additional evaluation activities.

<sup>3</sup> There is no modification to this SFR in the [MOD\_VI\_V1.0]. However, there are additions to the Peripheral Device Connections associated with this SFR and additional evaluation activities.

<sup>4</sup> There is no modification to this SFR in the [MOD\_KM\_V1.0]. However, there are additions to the Peripheral Device Connections associated with this SFR and additional evaluation activities.



Class	Identifier	Name	Source
	FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP	Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort Protocol)	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
	FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI	Sub-Protocol Rules (HDMI Protocol)	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
	FDP_SWI_EXT.1	PSD Switching	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
	FDP_SWI_EXT.2	PSD Switching Methods	[PP_PSD_V4.0] [MOD_KM_V1.0]
	FDP_SWI_EXT.3	Tied Switching	[MOD_KM_V1.0]
	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO	Unidirectional Data Flow (Audio Output)	[MOD_AO_V1.0]
	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM	Unidirectional Data Flow (Keyboard/Mouse)	[MOD_KM_V1.0]
	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI	Unidirectional Data Flow (Video Output)	[MOD_VI_V1.0]
Protection of the TSF (FPT)	FPT_FLS_EXT.1	Failure with Preservation of Secure State	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
	FPT_NTA_EXT.1	No Access to TOE	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
	FPT_PHP.1	Passive Detection of Physical Attack	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
	FPT_PHP.3	Resistance to Physical Attack	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
	FPT_TST.1	TSF testing	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
	FPT_TST_EXT.1	TSF Testing	[PP_PSD_V4.0]
TOE Access (FTA)	FTA_CIN_EXT.1	Continuous Indications	[PP_PSD_V4.0] [MOD_VI_V1.0] <sup>5</sup>

**Table 12 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements**

<sup>5</sup> The refinement from [MOD\_VI\_V1.0] has been included in FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1.2.

## 6.2.1 User Data Protection (FDP)

### 6.2.1.1 FDP\_AFL\_EXT.1 Audio Filtration

**FDP\_AFL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall ensure outgoing audio signals are filtered as per [Audio Filtration Specifications table].

Frequency (kHz)	Minimum Attenuation (dB)	Maximum Voltage After Attenuation
14	23.9	127.65 mV
15	26.4	95.73 mV
16	30.8	57.68 mV
17	35.0	35.57 mV
18	38.8	22.96 mV
19	43.0	14.15 mV
20	46.0	10.02 mV
30	71.4	0.53 mV
40	71.4	0.53 mV
50	71.4	0.53 mV
60	71.4	0.53 mV

**Table 13 – Audio Filtration Specifications**

### 6.2.1.2 FDP\_APC\_EXT.1/AO Active PSD Connections

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.1/AO** The TSF shall route user data only to ~~or from~~ the interfaces selected by the user.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.2/AO** The TSF shall ensure that no data **or electrical signals** flow between connected computers whether the TOE is powered on or powered off.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.3/AO** The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.4/AO** The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is in a failure state.

### 6.2.1.3 FDP\_APC\_EXT.1/KM Active PSD Connections

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.1/KM** The TSF shall route user data only to ~~or from~~ the interfaces selected by the user.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.2/KM** The TSF shall ensure that no data **or electrical signals** flow between connected computers whether the TOE is powered on or powered off.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.3/KM** The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.4/KM** The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is in a failure state.

#### 6.2.1.4 FDP\_APC\_EXT.1/VI Active PSD Connections

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.1/VI** The TSF shall route user data only to or from the interfaces selected by the user.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.2/VI** The TSF shall ensure that no data **or electrical signals** flow between connected computers whether the TOE is powered on or powered off.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.3/VI** The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off.

**FDP\_APC\_EXT.1.4/VI** The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is in a failure state.

#### 6.2.1.5 FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1/KM Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse)

**FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1.1/KM** The TSF shall have [*fixed*] device filtering for [**keyboard, mouse**] interfaces.

**FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1.2/KM** The TSF shall consider all [*PSD KM*] blacklisted devices as unauthorized devices for [**keyboard, mouse**] interfaces in peripheral device connections.

**FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1.3/KM** The TSF shall consider all [*PSD KM*] whitelisted devices as authorized devices for [**keyboard, mouse**] interfaces in peripheral device connections only if they are not on the [*PSD KM*] blacklist or otherwise unauthorized.

#### 6.2.1.6 FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1 Internal Protocol Conversion

**FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall convert the [*DisplayPort*] protocol at the [*DisplayPort computer video interface*] into the [*HDMI*] protocol within the TOE.

**FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall output the [*HDMI*] protocol from inside the TOE to [*peripheral display interface(s)*] as [[*DisplayPort*] protocol, [*HDMI*] protocol].

#### 6.2.1.7 FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall reject connections with unauthorized devices upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall reject connections with devices presenting unauthorized interface protocols upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.3** The TOE shall have no external interfaces other than those claimed by the TSF.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.4** The TOE shall not have wireless interfaces.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.5** The TOE shall provide a visual or auditory indication to the User when a peripheral is rejected.

### **6.2.1.8 FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2/AO Peripheral Device Connection (Audio Output)**

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2.1/AO** The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices as defined in [Appendix E<sup>6</sup>] and [  

- **authorized devices as defined in the PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,**
- **authorized devices as defined in the PP-Module for Video/Display Devices**

]  
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2.2/AO** The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in [Appendix E] and [  

- **authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in the PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,**
- **authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in the PP-Module for Video/Display Devices**

]  
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

### **6.2.1.9 FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2/KM Authorized Devices (Keyboard/Mouse)**

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2.1/KM** The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices **and functions** as defined in [Appendix E] and [  

- **authorized devices as defined in the PP-Module for Audio Output Devices,**
- **authorized devices as defined in the PP-Module for Video/Display Devices**

]  
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2.2/KM** The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in [Appendix E] and [  
]

---

<sup>6</sup> This refers to Appendix E of [PP\_PSD\_V4.0].

- **authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in the PP-Module for Audio Output Devices,**
- **authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in the PP-Module for Video/Display Devices**

] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

#### **6.2.1.10 FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2/VI Peripheral Device Connection (Video Output)**

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2.1/VI** The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices as defined in [Appendix E] and [

- **authorized devices as defined in the PP-Module for Audio Output Devices,**
- **authorized devices and functions as defined in the PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,**

] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2.2/VI** The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in [Appendix E] and [

- **authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in the PP-Module for Audio Output Devices,**
- **authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in the PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,**

] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE.

#### **6.2.1.11 FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3/KM Authorized Connection Protocols (Keyboard/Mouse)**

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3.1/KM** The TSF shall have interfaces for the [USB (keyboard), USB (mouse)] protocols.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3.2/KM** The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported protocols: [the TSF shall emulate any keyboard or mouse device functions from the TOE to the connected computer].

#### **6.2.1.12 FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3/VI Authorized Connection Protocols (Video Output)**

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3.1/VI** The TSF shall have interfaces for the [HDMI, DisplayPort] protocols.

**FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3.2/VI** The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported protocols: [*the TSF shall read the connected display EDID information once during power-on or reboot*].

### 6.2.1.13 FDP\_PUD\_EXT.1 Powering Unauthorized Devices

**FDP\_PUD\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall not provide power to any unauthorized device connected to the analog audio peripheral interface.

### 6.2.1.14 FDP\_RDR\_EXT.1 Re-Enumeration Device Rejection

**FDP\_RDR\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall reject any device that attempts to enumerate again as a different unauthorized device.

### 6.2.1.15 FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1 Residual Information Protection

**FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that no user data is written to TOE non-volatile memory or storage.

### 6.2.1.16 FDP\_RIP.1/KM Residual Information Protection (Keyboard Data)

**FDP\_RIP.1.1/KM** The TSF shall ensure that any **keyboard data in volatile memory** is **purged** upon **switching computers**.

### 6.2.1.17 FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1/DP Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort Protocol)

**FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1.1/DP** The TSF shall apply the following rules for the [*DisplayPort*] protocol:

- block the following video/display sub-protocols:
  - [*CEC,*
  - *EDID from computer to display,*
  - *HDCP,*
  - *MCCS*]
- allow the following video/display sub-protocols:
  - [*EDID from display to computer,*
  - *HPD from display to computer,*
  - *Link Training*].

### 6.2.1.18 FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1/HDMI Sub-Protocol Rules (HDMI Protocol)

**FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1.1/HDMI** The TSF shall apply the following rules for the [*HDMI*] protocol:

- block the following video/display sub-protocols:
  - [*ARC*
  - *CEC,*
  - *EDID from computer to display,*
  - *HDCP,*

- HEAC,
- HEC,
- MCCA]
- allow the following video/display sub-protocols:
  - [EDID from display to computer,
  - HPD from display to computer].

#### 6.2.1.19 FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1 PSD Switching

**FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that [*switching can be initiated only through express user action*].

#### 6.2.1.20 FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2 PSD Switching Methods

**FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall ensure that no switching can be initiated through automatic port scanning, control through a connected computer, or control through keyboard shortcuts.

**FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall ensure that switching can be initiated only through express user action using [*console buttons, peripheral devices using a guard*].

#### 6.2.1.21 FDP\_SWI\_EXT.3 Tied Switching

**FDP\_SWI\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall ensure that [*connected keyboard and mouse peripheral devices*] are always switched together to the same connected computer.

#### 6.2.1.22 FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1/AO Unidirectional Data Flow (Audio Output)

**FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1.1/AO** The TSF shall ensure [*analog audio output data*] transits the TOE unidirectionally from [*the TOE analog audio output computer*] interface to [*the TOE analog audio output peripheral*] interface.

#### 6.2.1.23 FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1/KM Unidirectional Data Flow (Keyboard/Mouse)

**FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1.1/KM** The TSF shall ensure [**keyboard, mouse**] data transits the TOE unidirectionally from the [*TOE [keyboard, mouse]*] peripheral interface(s) to the [*TOE [keyboard, mouse]*] interface.

#### 6.2.1.24 FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1/VI Unidirectional Data Flow (Video Output)

**FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1.1/VI** The TSF shall ensure [*video*] data transits the TOE unidirectionally from the [*TOE computer video*] interface to the [*TOE peripheral device display*] interface.

## 6.2.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

### 6.2.2.1 FPT\_FLS\_EXT.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State

**FPT\_FLS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: failure of the power-on self-test and [*failure of the antitamper function*].

### 6.2.2.2 FPT\_NTA\_EXT.1 No Access to TOE

**FPT\_NTA\_EXT.1.1** TOE firmware, software, and memory shall not be accessible via the TOE's external ports, with the following exceptions: [*the **Extended Display Identification Data (EDID)** memory of Video TOEs may be accessible from connected computers; the configuration data, settings, and logging data that may be accessible by authorized administrators*].

### 6.2.2.3 FPT\_PHP.1 Passive Detection of Physical Attack

**FPT\_PHP.1.1** The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF.

**FPT\_PHP.1.2** The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

### 6.2.2.4 FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack

**FPT\_PHP.3.1** The TSF shall resist [*a physical attack for the purpose of gaining access to the internal components, to damage the anti-tamper battery, to drain or exhaust the anti-tamper battery*] to the [*TOE enclosure and any remote controllers*] by the attacked component becoming permanently disabled.

### 6.2.2.5 FPT\_TST.1 TSF Testing

**FPT\_TST.1.1** The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests [*during initial start-up and at the conditions **[no other conditions]***] to demonstrate the correct operation of [*user control functions and **[active anti-tamper functionality]***].

**FPT\_TST.1.2** The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [*TSF data*].

**FPT\_TST.1.3** The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [*TSF*].

### 6.2.2.6 FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF Testing

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall respond to a self-test failure by providing users with a [*visual, auditory*] indication of failure and by shutdown of normal TSF functions.



## 6.2.3 TOE Access (FTA)

### 6.2.3.1 FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1 Continuous Indications

**FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall display a visible indication of the selected computers at all times when the TOE is powered.

**FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall implement the visible indication using the following mechanism: **easily visible graphical and/or textual markings of each source video on the display**, *[[illuminated buttons]]*.

**FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall ensure that while the TOE is powered the current switching status is reflected by *[multiple indicators which never display conflicting information]*.

## 6.3 ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, AND F1DN102KVM-HA-4

Section 6.3 details the security functional requirements that are satisfied by the F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, and F1DN102KVM-HA-4 TOE devices. These devices support a single connected display.

Class	Identifier	Name	Source
User Data Protection (FDP)	FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1)	Connected Displays Supported (F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, F1DN102KVM-HA-4)	[MOD_VI_V1.0]

**Table 14 – Summary of Additional Security Functional Requirements for F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, and F1DN102KVM-HA-4**

### 6.3.1 User Data Protection (FDP)

#### 6.3.1.1 FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1(1) Connected Displays Supported (F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4, F1DN102KVM-HA-4)

**FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1.1(1)** The TSF shall support *[one connected display]* at a time.

## 6.4 ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-

## UNN4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4, AND F1DN202KVM-HA-4

Section 6.4 details the security functional requirements that are satisfied by the F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4 and F1DN202KVM-HA-4 TOE devices. These devices support two connected displays.

Class	Identifier	Name	Source
User Data Protection (FDP)	FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2)	Connected Displays Supported (F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4, F1DN202KVM-HA-4)	[MOD_VI_V1.0]

**Table 15 – Summary of Additional Security Functional Requirements for F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4 and F1DN202KVM-HA-4**

### 6.4.1 User Data Protection (FDP)

#### 6.4.1.1 FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1(2) Connected Displays Supported (F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4, F1DN202KVM-HA-4)

**FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1.1(2)** The TSF shall support [*multiple connected displays*] at a time.

## 7 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

The assurance requirements are summarized in Table 16.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components	
	Identifier	Name
Development (ADV)	ADV_FSP.1	Basic Functional Specification
Guidance Documents (AGD)	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures
Life-Cycle Support (ALC)	ALC_CMC.1	Labeling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM Coverage
Security Target Evaluation (ASE)	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended Components Definition
	ASE_INT.1	ST Introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2	Security Objectives
	ASE_REQ.2	Derived Security Requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security Problem Definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE Summary Specification
Tests (ATE)	ATE_IND.1	Independent Testing - Conformance
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)	AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability Survey

**Table 16 – Security Assurance Requirements**

## 8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE

### 8.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE

Table 7 provides a mapping between the SFRs and Security Objectives.

### 8.2 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE

Table 17 identifies the Security Functional Requirements and their associated dependencies. It also indicates whether the ST explicitly addresses each dependency.

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FDP_AFL_EXT.1	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	Included
FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO	None	N/A
FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM	None	N/A
FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI	None	N/A
FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1)	None	N/A
FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2)	None	N/A
FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	Included
FDP_IPC_EXT.1	FDP_PDC_EXT.2	Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.1	None	N/A
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI	FDP_PDC_EXT.2	Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI	FDP_PDC_EXT.2	Included
FDP_PUD_EXT.1	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	Included
FDP_RDR_EXT.1	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	Included
FDP_RIP_EXT.1	None	N/A
FDP_RIP.1/KM	None	N/A
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP	FDP_PDC_EXT.3	Included
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI	FDP_PDC_EXT.3	Included

<b>SFR</b>	<b>Dependencies</b>	<b>Rationale Statement</b>
FDP_SWI_EXT.1	None	N/A
FDP_SWI_EXT.2	FDP_SWI_EXT.1	Included
FDP_SWI_EXT.3	FDP_SWI_EXT.1	Included
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1	Included
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1	Included
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI	FDP_APC_EXT.1	Included
FPT_FLS_EXT.1	FPT_TST.1 FPT_PHP.3	Included Included only if anti-tamper is selected in FPT_FLS_EXT.1.1
FPT_NTA_EXT.1	None	N/A
FPT_PHP.1	None	N/A
FPT_PHP.3	None	N/A
FPT_TST.1	None	N/A
FPT_TST_EXT.1	FPT_TST.1	Included
FTA_CIN_EXT.1	FDP_APC_EXT.1	Included

**Table 17 – Functional Requirement Dependencies**

## 8.2.1 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The TOE assurance requirements for this ST consist of the requirements indicated in the [PP\_PSD\_V4.0].

## 9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

This section provides a description of the security functions and assurance measures of the TOE that meet the TOE security requirements.

### 9.1 USER DATA PROTECTION

#### 9.1.1 System Controller

Each device includes a System Controller which is responsible for device management, user interaction, system control security functions, and device monitoring. It receives user input from the switches on the front panel and drives the TOE channel select lines that control switching circuits within the TOE.

The System Controller includes a microcontroller with internal non-volatile, Read Only Memory (ROM). The controller function manages the TOE functionality through a pre-programmed state machine loaded on the ROM as read-only firmware during product manufacturing.

Following boot up of the TOE, the channel select lines are set to Channel 1 by default. The channel select lines are also used to link the System Controller channel select commands to the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that supports video processing.

The user determines which host computer is to be connected to the peripherals by pressing a button on the TOE front panel. Switching can only be initiated through express user action.

The KVM devices may be switched with peripheral devices using a guard<sup>7</sup>. This is done by moving the mouse to the edge of the screen while pressing the left CTRL key.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_SWI\_EXT.1, FDP\_SWI\_EXT.2.

##### 9.1.1.1 Active PSD Connections

The TOE ensures that data flows only between the peripherals and the connected computer selected by the user. No data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off, or when the TOE is in a failure state. A failure state occurs when the TOE fails a self-test when powering on, or when the anti-tampering function has been triggered.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_APC\_EXT.1/AO, FDP\_APC\_EXT.1/KM, FDP\_APC\_EXT.1/VI.

##### 9.1.1.2 Connected Computer Interfaces

The connected computers are attached to the TOE as follows:

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<sup>7</sup> See Section 10.1 or [PP\_PSD\_V4.0] for the definition of a guard.

- The TOE connects to the keyboard and mouse port using a USB A to USB B cable. The USB A end attaches to the computer, and the USB B end attaches to the TOE
- The TOE is connected to the computer video port using a video cable supporting DisplayPort or HDMI
- The TOE audio-in is connected to the computer audio-out using a 1/8" stereo plug cable

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1.

### 9.1.1.3 Residual Information Protection

The Letter of Volatility is included as Annex A.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1.

## 9.1.2 Keyboard and Mouse Switching Functionality

### 9.1.2.1 Keyboard and Mouse Enumeration

The TOE determines whether or not a peripheral device that has been plugged into the keyboard and mouse peripheral ports is allowed to operate with the TOE. The TOE uses optical data diodes to enforce a unidirectional data flow from the user peripherals to the coupled hosts, and uses isolated device emulators to prevent data leakage through the peripheral switching circuitry.

The Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) in the host and device emulator circuitry stores USB Host stack parameters and up to the last 4 key codes. User data may be briefly retained; however, there are no data buffers. Data is erased during power off of the KVM, and when the user switches channels. When the TOE switches from one computer to another, the system controller ensures that the keyboard and mouse stacks are deleted, and that any data received from the keyboard in the first 100 milliseconds following switching is deleted. This is done to ensure that any data buffered in the keyboard microcontroller is not passed to the newly selected computer.

The TOE supports USB Type A HID's on keyboard and mouse ports. The USB bidirectional communication protocol is converted into a unidirectional proprietary protocol, and is then converted back into the USB bidirectional protocol to communicate with the coupled computer hosts.

A USB keyboard is connected to the TOE keyboard host emulator through the console keyboard port. The keyboard host emulator is a microcontroller which enumerates the connected keyboard and verifies that it is a permitted device type. Once the keyboard has been verified, the USB keyboard sends scan codes, which are generated when the user types. These scan codes are converted by the keyboard host emulator into a proprietary protocol data stream that is combined with the data stream from the mouse host emulator.

Similarly, the USB mouse is connected to the TOE mouse host emulator through the USB mouse port. The mouse host emulator is a microcontroller which enumerates the connected mouse and verifies that it is a permitted device type. Once the mouse device has been verified, it sends serial data generated by

mouse movement and button use. The mouse serial data is converted by the mouse host emulator into a proprietary protocol data stream that is combined with the data stream from the keyboard host emulator.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3/KM, FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1/KM, FDP\_RIP.1/KM.

### 9.1.2.2 Keyboard and Mouse Switching Functionality

The combined data stream is passed through the channel select lines to the selected host channel. The channel select lines are driven by the System Controller Module, and the selection is based on user input through use of the mouse or keyboard. Once a channel is selected, the combined mouse and keyboard data stream is passed through an optical data diode and routed to the specific host channel device emulator. The optical data diode is an opto-coupler designed to physically prevent reverse data flow. The keyboard and mouse can only be switched together.

Device emulators are USB enabled microcontrollers that are programmed to emulate a standard USB keyboard and mouse composite device. The combined data stream is converted back to bidirectional data before reaching the selected host computer.

Since the keyboard and mouse function are emulated by the TOE, the connected computer is not able to send data to the keyboard that would allow it to indicate that Caps Lock, Num Lock or Scroll Lock are set. These are indicated on the TOE front panel, on the right hand side, as shown in Figure 6 in Section 9.3.1.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_APC\_EXT.1/KM, FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1/KM, FDP\_SWI\_EXT.3.

### 9.1.2.3 Keyboard and Mouse Compatible Device Types

The TOE employs fixed device filtering and accepts only USB HID devices at the keyboard and mouse peripheral ports. Only USB Type A connections are permitted. The TOE does not support a wireless connection to a mouse, keyboard or USB hub.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1, FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2/KM, FDP\_FIL\_EXT.1/KM.

### 9.1.2.4 Re-Enumeration Device Rejection


If a connected device attempts to re-enumerate as a different USB device type, it will be rejected by the TOE.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_RDR\_EXT.1.

## 9.1.3 Video Switching Functionality

Video data flow is comprised of unidirectional Extended Display Identification Data (EDID) and video data flow paths. Figure 3 shows a data flow during the display EDID read function.






**Figure 3 – Display EDID Read Function**

An EDID read event only occurs as the TOE is being powered up. The video controller reads the EDID content from the display device to verify that it is valid and usable. If data is not valid, TOE operation will cease and wait for the display peripheral to be changed.


Figure 3 shows a data flow during the display EDID read function.



**Figure 4 – Display EDID Write Function**

Figure 4 illustrates the video controller (shown in blue) as it writes the EDID content into the first channel emulated EDID Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) chip (shown in gray). The thick lines in this figure indicate native video lines, and the thin lines indicate Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) lines. The EDID multiplexer couples the I2C lines to the first EDID mode switch (shown in orange). The first EDID mode switch switches the video controller I2C lines to the first emulated EDID EEPROM chip (shown in gray). The chip write protect switch opens to enable writing. The video controller uses the I2C lines to write to the first emulated EDID EEPROM chip. Once the write operation is complete and verified, the video controller switches the EDID multiplexer to the next channel and the operation repeats until all chips are programmed. Once the write operation is complete, the video controller switches to normal operating mode, as shown in Figure 5 below.

In EDID write mode, the Emulated EDID EEPROM chips are switched to their respective computers to enable reading of the EDID information. The write protect switches are switched back to protected mode to prevent any attempt to write to the EEPROM or to transmit MCCS commands.



**Figure 5 – Display Normal Mode**

In normal mode, each computer interface operates independently. The power to each emulated EDID EEPROM is received from its respective computer through the video cable. The main video multiplexer is switched to the user selected computer to enable the proper video display.

During TOE normal operation (Figure 5), any attempt by a connected computer to affect the EDID channel is blocked by the architecture. Each computer is only able to affect its own emulated EDID EEPROM.

Video input interfaces are isolated from one another. Isolation is achieved through the use of separate power and ground planes, separate electronic components and a separate emulated EDID chip for each channel.

The EDID function is emulated by an independent emulation EEPROM chip for each computer channel. These chips read content from the connected display once during TOE power up. Any subsequent change to the display peripheral will be ignored.

The TOE will reject any display device that does not present valid EDID content. An LED on the rear panel of the TOE will indicate a rejected display device.

The TOE supports DisplayPort versions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, and HDMI 2.0:

- For DisplayPort connections, the TOE video function filters the AUX channel by converting it to I2C EDID only. DisplayPort video is converted

into an HDMI video stream, and the I2C EDID lines connected to the emulated EDID EEPROM functions as shown in the figures above. This allows EDID to be passed from the display to the computer (as described above), and allows Hot-Plug Detection (HPD) and Link Training information to pass through the TOE. AUX channel threats are mitigated through the conversion from DisplayPort to HDMI protocols. Traffic types including USB, Ethernet, MCCS, and EDID write from the computer to the display are blocked by the TOE. High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) and Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) functions are not connected

- For HDMI connections, EDID information is allowed to pass from the display to the computer, as described above. HPD information is also allowed to pass. Other protocols, including Audio Return Channel (ARC), EDID from the computer to the display, HDMI Ethernet and Audio Return Channel (HEAC), and HDMI Ethernet Channel (HEC) are blocked. HDCP and Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) functions are not connected

The TOE video function blocks MCCS write transactions through the emulated EDID EEPROMs. The emulated EEPROMs support only EDID read transactions, and are isolated by the write protect switch.

Following triggering of the anti-tampering function, following a failed self-test, or when the TOE is powered off, all video input signals are isolated from other video inputs and from the video output interfaces by the active video re-drivers. Emulated EDID EEPROMs may still operate since they are powered by their respective computers; however, the video function remains isolated.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_IPC\_EXT.1, FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1/DP, FDP\_SPR\_EXT.1/HDMI.

### 9.1.3.1 Video Compatible Device Types

The TOE accepts any DisplayPort or HDMI display device at the video peripheral ports. The TOE does not support a wireless connection to a video display.

The F1DN104KVM-UNN4, F1DN102KVM-UNN4, F1DN104KVM-HA-4 and F1DN102KVM-HA-4 devices support a single video display. The F1DN204KVM-UNN4, F1DN202KVM-UNN4, F1DN204KVM-HA-4 and F1DN202KVM-HA-4 devices support two video displays.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1, FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2/VI, FDP\_PDC\_EXT.3/VI, FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1(1), FDP\_CDS\_EXT.1(2).

### 9.1.4 Audio Switching Functionality

The TOE audio data flow path is electrically isolated from all other functions and interfaces to prevent signaling data leakages to and from the audio paths.

Audio switching is controlled by the system controller function through dedicated unidirectional command lines. Audio signals cannot be digitized or otherwise sampled by any TOE circuitry. The TOE audio switching multiplexer uses a

combination of mechanical relays and a solid-state multiplexer to ensure isolation. Unidirectional flow data diodes prevent audio data flow from an audio device to a selected computer. There is a separate audio interface for each computer. Each interface is electrically isolated from other interfaces, and from other TOE circuitry. These features ensure that the audio filtration specification requirements are met.

The TOE does not supply power to the analog audio output interface, and cannot be configured to do so. Therefore, it cannot be used to supply power to an unauthorized device on that interface.

When the TOE is powered off, an audio isolation relay is open, thereby isolating the audio input from the computer interfaces from all other circuitry and interfaces. Following triggering of the anti-tampering function, or following a failed self-test, the TOE will de-energize this audio isolation relay to isolate the audio inputs. The audio subsystem does not store, convert or delay audio data flows. Therefore, there is no risk of audio overflow when switching between channels.

The audio switching functionality features a separate channel selection control with an optional freeze function. This allows the audio port to stay connected to a specific computer while switching keyboard, video, mouse and authentication devices between other computers.

The use of analog microphone or line-in audio devices is strictly prohibited as indicated in the user guidance. The TOE will reject a microphone through the following two methods:

- There is an analog audio data diode that forces data to flow only from a computer to an audio peripheral device
- There is a microphone Direct Current (DC) bias barrier that blocks an electret microphone DC bias if the TOE is deliberately or inadvertently connected to the microphone input jack of a connected computer

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_AFL\_EXT.1, FDP\_PUD\_EXT.1, FDP\_UDF\_EXT.1/AO.

#### **9.1.4.1 Audio Compatible Device Types**

The TOE accepts analog headphones or analog speakers connected via a 1/8" (3.5mm) audio jack at the audio peripheral port. The TOE does not support a wireless connection to an audio output device.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FDP\_PDC\_EXT.1, FDP\_PDC\_EXT.2/AO.

## **9.2 PROTECTION OF THE TSF**

### **9.2.1 No Access to TOE**

Connected computers do not have access to TOE firmware or memory, with the following exceptions:

- EDID data is accessible to connected computers from the TOE
- Authorized administrators use a connected computer to access configuration data and settings
- Authorized administrators use a connected computer to access TOE audit records

All of the TOE microcontrollers run from internal protected flash memory. Firmware cannot be updated from an external source. Firmware cannot be read or rewritten through the use of Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) tools. Firmware is executed on Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) with the appropriate protections to prevent external access and tampering of code or stacks.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FPT\_NTA\_EXT.1.

## 9.2.2 Anti-tampering Functionality

The TOE provides both passive and active anti-tampering functionality.

### 9.2.2.1 Passive Detection of Physical Tampering

The TOE enclosure was designed specifically to prevent physical tampering. It features a stainless-steel welded chassis and panels that prevent external access through bending or brute force.

Additionally, each device is fitted with one or more holographic Tampering Evident Labels placed at critical locations on the TOE enclosure. If the label is removed, the word 'VOID' appears on both the label and the product surface.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FPT\_PHP.1.

### 9.2.2.2 Resistance to Physical Attack

The anti-tampering system is mechanically coupled to the TOE enclosure to detect any attempt to access the TOE internal circuitry. Any attempt to separate the pieces of the enclosure to access the internal circuitry will trigger the anti-tampering function. Power is provided to the circuitry by the TOE power supply and by a backup battery. If the self-test detects that the battery is depleted or failing, the anti-tampering function will be triggered.

When the anti-tampering function is triggered, it causes an internal microscopic fuse on the System Controller (on-die) to melt. This permanently disables all interfaces and user functions of the device, and causes the front panel LEDs to blink sequentially and continuously. The TOE anti-tampering function is irreversible.

All anti-tampering events are recorded in TOE internal non-volatile memory with the time and date and may be read from the audit logs.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FPT\_FLS\_EXT.1, FPT\_PHP.3.

## 9.2.3 TSF Testing

The TOE performs a self-test at initial start-up. The self-test runs independently at each microcontroller and performs the following checks:

- Verification of the front panel push-buttons
- Verification of the active anti-tampering functionality, including the continued functionality of the backup battery
- Verification of the integrity of the microcontroller firmware
- Verification of computer port isolation. This is tested by sending test packets to various interfaces and attempting to detect this traffic at all other interfaces

If the self-test fails, the LEDs on the front panel blink to indicate the failure. The TOE disables the PSD switching functionality, and remains in a disabled state until the self-test is rerun and passes. All self-test failures are recorded in the log file, together with the date and time.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FPT\_FLS\_EXT.1, FPT\_TST.1, FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.

## 9.3 TOE ACCESS

### 9.3.1 Continuous Indications

The TOE user switches between computers by pressing the corresponding front panel button on the device. The front panel button corresponding to the selected computer will illuminate.

When switching between computers with audio output, the audio peripheral device is switched accordingly. When switching to a computer that is not connected to an audio device, the audio device will remain mapped to the last channel that supported the connection. A user can select to 'Freeze Audio' to a channel by performing a long press on the channel button to lock the audio device to the currently connected computer. When the user switches the other peripherals to another channel, the audio device will remain attached to the previously selected channel and the 'Freeze Audio' LED to the left of the channel selection button will be illuminated. To release the freeze, the user performs a second long press on the channel button.

Figure 6 shows the selection buttons.



**Figure 6 – Channel Selection**

On power up, all peripherals are connected to channel #1, and the corresponding push button LED will be illuminated.

**TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed:** FTA\_CIN\_EXT.1.

# 10 TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS

## 10.1 TERMINOLOGY

The following terminology is used in this ST:

Term	Description
AO	AO refers to the requirements for Audio Output Devices.
AUX	AUX refers to the auxiliary channel, particularly as it applies to the DisplayPort protocol.
guard	A PSD function that requires multiple express user actions in order to switch between Connected Computers using Connected Peripherals.
KM	KM refers to the requirements for Keyboard/Mouse Devices.
VI	VI refers to the requirements for Video/Display Devices.

**Table 18 – Terminology**

## 10.2 ACRONYMS

The following acronyms are used in this ST:

Acronym	Definition
ARC	Audio Return Channel
CC	Common Criteria
CCID	Chip Card Interface Device
CDF	Configurable Device Filtration
CEC	Consumer Electronics Control
dB	decibel
DC	Direct Current
DE	Device Emulator
EDID	Extended Display Identification Data
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
FET	Field-Effect Transistor
FPGA	Field Programmable Gate Array
HDCP	High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection
HDMI	High-Definition Multimedia Interface



Acronym	Definition
HE	Host Emulator
HEAC	HDMI Ethernet and Audio Return Channel
HEC	HDMI Ethernet Channel
HID	Human Interface Device
HPD	Hot-Plug Detection
I2C	Inter-Integrated Circuit
ID	Identification
IT	Information Technology
JTAG	Joint Test Action Group
kHz	kilohertz
KVM	Keyboard, Video, Mouse
LED	Light Emitting Diode
MCCS	Monitor Control Command Set
mV	millivolt
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
OTP	One Time Programming
PP	Protection Profile
PSD	Peripheral Sharing Device
RAM	Random Access Memory
ROM	Read Only Memory
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SRAM	Static Random Access Memory
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
USB	Universal Serial Bus
VID/PID	Vendor Identification/Product Identification

**Table 19 – Acronyms**

## 11 REFERENCES

Identifier	Title
<b>[CC]</b>	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017</li> <li>• Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017</li> <li>• Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017</li> </ul>
<b>[CEM]</b>	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
<b>[Belkin Admin]</b>	Belkin SKVM/SKM Administration Guide, LNKPG-00666 Rev. A00
<b>[PP_PSD_V4.0]</b>	Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version: 4.0, 2019-07-19
<b>[MOD_AO_V1.0]</b>	PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, 2019-07-19
<b>[MOD_KM_V1.0]</b>	PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 2019-07-19
<b>[MOD_VI_1.0]</b>	PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 2019-07-19
<b>[CFG_PSD-AO-KM-VI_V1.0]</b>	PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, 19 July 2019

**Table 20 – References**

## ANNEX A – LETTER OF VOLATILITY

The table below provides volatility information and memory types for the Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices. User data is not retained in any TOE device when the power is turned off.

Product Models	Number in each product	Function, Manufacturer and Part Number	Storage Type	Size	Power Source (if not the TOE)	Volatility	Contains User Data
F1DN104KVM-UNN4 F1DN204KVM-UNN4 F1DN104KVM-HA-4 F1DN204KVM-HA-4	1	System Controller, Host emulators: ST Microelectronics STM32F446ZCT	Embedded SRAM <sup>1</sup>	128KB		Volatile	May contain user data
			Embedded Flash <sup>2</sup>	256KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
			Embedded EEPROM <sup>3</sup>	4KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
			OTP Memory	512bytes		Non-Volatile	Event logs are saved
	5 in Single head or 10 in Dual head models	Video Controller: ST Microelectronics STM32F070C6T6	Embedded SRAM <sup>1</sup>	6KB		Volatile	No user data
			Embedded Flash <sup>2</sup>	32KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
			Embedded EEPROM <sup>3</sup>	4KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
	4	Device emulators: ST Microelectronics STM32F070C6T6	Embedded SRAM <sup>1</sup>	6KB	Connected computer	Volatile	May contain user data
			Embedded Flash <sup>2</sup>	32KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
			Embedded EEPROM <sup>3</sup>	4KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
F1DN102KVM-UNN4 F1DN202KVM-UNN4 F1DN102KVM-HA-4 F1DN202KVM-HA-4	1	System Controller, Host emulators: ST Microelectronics STM32F446ZCT	Embedded SRAM <sup>1</sup>	128KB		Volatile	May contain user data
			Embedded Flash <sup>2</sup>	256KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
			Embedded EEPROM <sup>3</sup>	4KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
			OTP Memory	512bytes		Non-Volatile	Event logs are saved
		Video Controller:	Embedded SRAM <sup>1</sup>	16KB		Volatile	No user data

	3 in Single head or 6 in Dual head models	ST Microelectronics STM32F070C6T6	Embedded Flash <sup>2</sup>	128KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
			Embedded EEPROM <sup>3</sup>	4KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
	2	Device emulators: ST Microelectronics STM32F070C6T6	Embedded SRAM <sup>1</sup>	16KB	Connected computer	Volatile	May contain user data
			Embedded Flash <sup>2</sup>	128KB		Non-Volatile	No user data
			Embedded EEPROM <sup>3</sup>	4KB		Non-Volatile	No user data

**Notes:**

<sup>1</sup> SRAM stores USB Host stack parameters and up to the last 4 key-codes. Data is erased during power off of the KVM, and when the user switches channels. Device emulators receive power from the individual connected computers and therefore devices are powered on as long as the associated computer is powered on and connected.

<sup>2</sup> Flash storage is used to store firmware code. It contains no user data. Flash storage is permanently locked by fuses after initial programming to prevent rewriting. It is an integral part of the ST Microcontroller together with SRAM and EEPROM.

<sup>3</sup> EEPROM is used to store operational parameters, such as display Plug & Play. They contain no user data. These devices receive power from the individual computers connected to the TOE, and therefore are powered on as long as the associated computer is powered on and connected.

## ANNEX B – SFR DEVICE MATRIX

Table 21 indicates the SFRs supported by each device.

	FDP_AFL_EXT.1	FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO	FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM	FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI	FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1)	FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2)	FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM	FDP_IPC_EXT.1	FDP_PDC_EXT.1	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM	FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI	FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM	FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI	FDP_PUD_EXT.1	FDP_RDR_EXT.1	FDP_RIP_EXT.1	FDP_RIP.1/KM	FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP	FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI	FDP_SWI_EXT.1	FDP_SWI_EXT.2	FDP_SWI_EXT.3	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM	FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI	FPT_FLS_EXT.1	FPT_NTA_EXT.1	FPT_PHP.1	FPT_PHP.3	FPT_TST.1	FPT_TST_EXT.1	FTA_CIN_EXT.1		
F1DN104KVM-UNN4 F1DN104KVM-HA-4	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
F1DN204KVM-UNN4 F1DN204KVM-HA-4	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
F1DN102KVM-UNN4 F1DN102KVM-HA-4	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
F1DN202KVM-UNN4 F1DN202KVM-HA-4	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

**Table 21 – Security Functional Requirements and Devices**